According to Biometric Update, facial images on T-shirts can be subject to counterfeiting. T-shirts have become a threat to facial recognition, but a new study shows how to prevent it!

Discussions about biometric attacks typically focus on financial fraud attempts, but the increasing use of facial recognition in public places has prompted researchers to develop ways to trick the technology into bypassing security or surveillance. One method that has proven effective in controlled experiments involves images of attackers on T-shirts. The latest development in this field involves replacing images with face-presentation attacks: a T-shirt with a printed human face is presented to the camera, fooling the facial recognition system into believing it’s seeing a real, three-dimensional face.

A new paper by a group of researchers at the University of Applied Sciences in Germany presents a way to prevent these very facial attacks.

The researchers tested 3 widely used open-source face detection algorithms: RetinaFace, MTCNN, and dlib, against the T-shirt Face Presentation Attack (TFPA) database. The database contains over 1,600 images from 100 different T-shirts, each with a face printed on it.

8 people wore T-shirts with their faces printed on them in various poses, and their images were captured using a RealSense D435 camera, capable of capturing depth information in 3D images.

In almost all cases, the facial detection algorithms detected the face on the T-shirt. The average estimated detection rate of the three algorithms exceeded 99% for all eight poses, according to the results. The study also found that if the attacker concealed the face by covering it with hands, wearing a face mask, or tilting the head, the facial biometric system would likely return a match to the T-shirt—meaning the attack would be successful.

The success of this presentation attack is concerning because T-shirts are easy to create. They can also be concealed under a jacket, making them easier to use under surveillance than something conspicuous, such as a paper mask. T-shirt attacks have already been identified by border authorities as a potential threat.

To address this issue, the researchers expanded the database to include 152 authentic presentations and proposed a new detection method. According to the research results, the proposed algorithm can be easily combined with traditional presentation attack detection algorithms.

Text based on https://www.biometricupdate.com/202605/t-shirts-have-become-a-facial-recognition-threat-a-new-study-shows-how-to-stop-it

Let’s start with what morphing is.

Morphing is an image transformation technique that smoothly changes one image into another, used in film and computer animation.

Voice morphing (or voice conversion) is an advanced digital audio processing technique that seamlessly transforms one person’s voice (the source) into another person’s voice (the target), while preserving the content of the speech. It uses artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, machine learning, and digital signal processing (DSP). The system analyzes the characteristics of the source voice (timbre, pitch, timbre) and maps them to the characteristics of the target voice.

Researchers analyzing a signal-level approach to voice morphing attacks have revealed vulnerabilities in biometric voice recognition systems. They demonstrated that voice morphing attacks combine identities to bypass voice biometrics.

This is time-domain voice identity morphing (TD-VIM), which allows for the mixing of identities without embedding them in a structure or reference text.

In biometric systems, it’s common practice to associate each sample or template with a specific individual. Advanced voice identity morphing (VIM) allows the generation of a sample that combines the identities of two or more speakers. “The modified voice sample can be used to match all identities whose voice samples were used to generate morphing attacks, which poses a high risk in application scenarios such as banking and finance, where a single identity verification is essential.”

To investigate this issue, the research team created four distinct morphing signals and assessed their effectiveness through a comprehensive vulnerability analysis. The data was compared to the Generalized Morphing Attack Potential (G-MAP) metric, “which measures attack effectiveness in two deep learning-based speaker verification systems (SVS) and one commercial system, Verispeak.”
The results highlight the effectiveness of the TD-VIM method in bypassing advanced verification mechanisms, underscoring the importance of improving SVS security.


The research comes from the Indian Institute of Technology and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

more about the voice morphing phenomenon here

It turns out that deepfake audio can be more dangerous than video! According to the Pindrop report, in the two years 2023-2024 there was a 760% increase in the number of such deepfakes (audio).


In an era of increasing attacks, self-awareness seems to be a key barrier protecting humans from these types of threats. It is about:

●  limited trust in voice assistants,
● knowledge of social techniques used by fraudsters,
● control over the content you publish on the Internet.

In system solutions, it is obvious to use advanced biometric technologies and methodologies to detect deepfakes in real time.

For example, Pindrop uses a technique called acoustic fingerprinting as one of its capabilities. This involves creating a digital signature for each voice based on its acoustic properties, such as pitch, tone, and cadence. These signatures are then used to compare and match voices across calls and interactions. For more on deepfakes, check out this podcast with Vijay Balasubramaniyan, CEO of Pindrop. Link below
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202504/biometric-update-podcast-digs-into-deepfakes-with-pindrop-ceo

As a reminder, Pindrop is a company based in Atlanta, USA.  Their solutions are leading the way for the future of voice communications, setting the standard for identity, security, and trust in every voice interaction.  More at pindrop.com

For several days now, the echoes of the loud prank on President Duda, who instead of President Macron, talked to Russian pranksters – Vladimir Kuznetsov (Vovan) and Alexei Stoljarov (Lexus) – have not been silent.

As part of our current research and development activity, we biometrically analyzed the recordings of the pranksters’ voices and compared them with the voice of the real Macron (Polish and English versions). We downloaded all voice samples in the form of individual recordings from the public domain on YouTube. Our goal was to confirm the effectiveness of biometric systems for this specific situation – identifying fraud.

What did the BiometrIQ analysis show? It turned out that the voice of one of the “Lexus” pranksters was just over 50% consistent with the voice of the President of France and as much as 97% consistent with the voice of the false president. The voice of the second one – “Vovana” – showed no similarities (0%) to the fake president.

 This clearly proves that thanks to biometric analysis we managed to:

=> detect the fact, only after 1 minute, that a fake president was involved in the conversation

=> identify the identity of the fictional president (Lexus)

=> confirm that the public domain is a very good source of voice samples, which may not always be used for noble purposes

=> strengthen the thesis that attacks using social engineering are the most effective, and in this case it was the choice of the right time when we are dealing with increased stress (rocket drop).